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The extent of protection afforded by the First Amendment has
expanded greatly dtiring the last three decades,' and the institutional
press2 has benefited from this expansion. 3 Also during this period the
states have increased the protection afforded individual privacy,4 in-
cluding individual reputation.5 These expanding notions of free press
and privacy often clash, and their conflict is most evident in the area
of defamation. Although the Supreme Court has held that defamation,
because it is false speech, is not protected by the First Amendment,
the cases limit the scope of state libel laws in various ways in order
that the press0 will not be inhibited from publishing or broadcasting
I. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (po-
litical contributions); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (symbolic speech); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (parades).
2. This Note is based on certain generalizations concerning the activities of the in-
stitutional press that may not apply to all mass media outlets. See p. 1735 (discussing
press selection and packaging of information); cf. Curtis, Responsibility for Raising Stan-
dards, in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS 95 (G. Gross ed. 1966) (there are thousands
of individual press outlets).
3. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (edi-
torial function serves First Amendment); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) (prior restraint cannot prevent publication of stolen documents procured
by press).
4. Although the tort of invasion of privacy, like that of libel, can potentially inhibit
individual expression, the Supreme Court has held that it serves a legitimate state in-
terest. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 579 (1977) (state
protection afforded individuals through privacy tort does not violate First Amendment);
cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973) (constitutional right to privacy implicated in
woman's decision to have abortion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Fourth
Amendment privacy right forbids electronic surveillance even without physical intrusion).
5. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(law of defamation designed to enable individual "to preserve a certain privacy around
his personality"); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (law
of defamation reflects "our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being").
6. Although New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), dealt with both
media and nonmedia defendants, the Court showed specific concern for the institutional
press, such as daily newspapers, broadcasters and news magazines. Id. at 278 (recognizing
that "pall of fear and timidity imposed" on press by threat of large judgments will lead
to unacceptable self-censorship). Moreover, it has been suggested that the liability rule
announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-48 (1974), is designed to
apply only when the defendant is part of the institutional press. Compare Calero v. Del
Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 500, 228 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1975) (Gertz does not apply to
nonmedia defendants) and Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Dis-
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expression that does fall within the scope of First Amendment guaran-
tees. The Court has attempted, through a process of definitional bal-
ancing,7 to construct liability rules that accommodate this First Amend-
ment need with the states' legitimate interest in protecting individual
reputation.8
tinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 902 (1974) (arguing
that Gertz applies only to media defendants) with Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 584, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976) (Gertz standard applied to nonmedia defendant) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment e (1976) (applying Gertz to all defa-
mation actions regardless of status of defendant). Because most libel actions are brought
against the institutional press and because the press is thus subject to large libel judg-
ments on a fairly regular basis, this Note focuses on the relationship of the law of
defamation to the activities of the institutional press protected by the First Amendment.
This Note does not argue that the press is protected to a greater extent than indi-
viduals; rather it simply observes that the press is protected when it performs functions
serving the First Amendment. Similarly, this Note does not contend that the press receives
special institutional protection under the press clause, as has recently been suggested.
See generally Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977);
Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy: What Does it Add to
Freedom of Speech? 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631 (1975). There are several difficulties with the latter approach. First, the history
of the amendment indicates the Framers probably did not intend a differentiation between
"speech" and "press." Z. CHAFEF, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 34-35 (1947).
Second, the current role of the press may be a fleeting historical phenomenon that should
not be frozen in the First Amendment. Cf. Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 106 (1975) (discussing how role of press has changed over time).
Third, there are seemingly insurmountable obstacles involved in constructing an accurate
yet flexible definition of "press." See id. (arguing that definition based on wide dis-
semination would exclude pamphleteer, whom "the Framers themselves would have
recognized" as member of press). Fourth, separate press clause recognition might dilute
the protection afforded nonpress "speech," which performs the same constitutionally
favored functions. Above all, the constitutionally protected activities of the institutional
press, if recognized, can be safeguarded adequately under the First Amendment itself.
7. See generally Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1434-35 (1962) (although ad hoc balancing does not protect First Amendment rights
adequately, courts should weigh competing interests in devising rule to be applied
in future cases); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 944-45 (1968)
(unlike balancing on case-by-case basis, rule based on definitional balancing "can be
employed in future cases without the occasion for further weighing of interests"); cf.
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (Court "categorizes" in solving
numerous First Amendment problems).
Because the Court has held that defamation is not "speech" within the meaning of
the First Amendment, see p. 1726 infra, it has engaged in definitional balancing of
competing interests. This Note does not suggest that the level of protection afforded to
First Amendment "speech" should be based on definitional balancing.
8. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) ("Society has a pervasive and
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.")
For recent judicial discussion highlighting the tension between privacy and press, see
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1975) (broadcasting name of
rape victim). Cf. Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87
YALE L.J. 1601, 1606-10 (1978) (competing interests in Nixon papers). See also Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1306 (press-privacy tension present in decision
limiting access to Nixon tapes).
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After achieving near unanimity in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9
the Court was unable to reach a consensus in its subsequent attempts
to reconcile these competing interests. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' 0
however, five Justices agreed on new liability rules that promised to
accommodate press and privacy concerns, primarily through creation
of a "public figure" standard." The public figure standard was de-
signed to grant increased protection to the institutional press by lim-
iting the power of the states to use libel judgments to vindicate the
individual reputations of the class of people defined as public figures.
This limitation was based on the premise that the states do not have
a substantial interest in protecting these people from defamation.' 2
This Note contends that the public figure standard threatens the
very editorial process it seeks to protect and has resulted in a serious
intrusion into the daily activities of journalists. 13 First Amendment
protection of this editorial function requires a restructuring of the
public figure standard adopted in Gertz.
I. Development of the Constitutional Standard:
From New York Times to Gertz
The history of the Court's attempt to accommodate the First Amend-
ment with the state interests underlying defamation law is directly
relevant to an analysis of the Gertz standard. Elements of the public
figure standard have their genesis in earlier cases, and the alternative
doctrinal approaches apparent in these early cases facilitate under-
standing of the Court's conception of the competing interests involved.
A. New York Times: The Common Ground for Public Officials
In New York Times the Supreme Court reversed a state court judg-
ment awarding damages to a public official who claimed injury due
to statements, some of them false, in a paid advertisement.14 The
Court formulated several First Amendment principles that have been
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Justices Black and Douglas consistently advanced an abso-
lutist approach by arguing that the law of defamation is unconstitutional in its entirety.
See, e.g., id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring). That approach has never received the support
of other Justices and this Note will not consider it.
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. Id. at 345. See p. 1733 infra.
12. See pp. 1733-34 infra (discussing Gertz assessment of legitimate state interest in
individual reputation).
13. See pp. 1739-43 infra (discussing Gertz' interference with editorial process).
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1964).
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used in subsequent attempts by the Court to reconcile First Amend-
ment and state interests.
New York Times acknowledged that defamation does not come with-
in First Amendment protection for expression.1a The Court held,
however, that some defamatory statements must be given constitutional
protection to ensure that protected expression is not inhibited."0
Rather than vary this First Amendment protection with the indi-
vidual plaintiff's need for state protection in each case, the Court en-
gaged in definitional balancing and formulated a liability rule de-
signed to indicate the degree of protection to be afforded defamation
in future cases. The Justices defined the First Amendment interest
by examining the functions served by speech and press activity. The
Court concluded that First Amendment activity is favored to the ex-
tent it facilitates "debate on public issues"'17 because, as the next
major defamation case after New York Times explained, "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government.""' This functional analysis of expression empha-
sized that the First Amendment facilitates self-government by assuring
a free flow of information with which the citizen can make informed
political choices. In attempting to reflect this First Amendment in-
terest in its constitutional analysis, the Court argued that the Consti-
tution embodies a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open."19
15. Id. at 268; accord, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957) (dictum);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (dictum).
16. 376 U.S. at 271-72 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). In New
York Times, the Court determined for the first time that defamatory speech should be
given some constitutional protection in order to afford "breathing space" to First Amend-
ment speech. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
17. Id. at 270.
18. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1965). The New York Times Court
derived this "central meaning" of the First Amendment. 376 U.S. at 273, from earlier
precedents. Id. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (First Amend-
ment designed to facilitate discussion aimed at bringing about "political and social
changes desired by the people"), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)
(First Amendment designed to maintain "free political discussion to the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the people")).
19. 376 U.S. at 270. The Court's reasoning is supported by many scholarly discus-
sions. See, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-45
(1969) (structure of Constitution indicates First Amendment designed to facilitate self-
government); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27
(1948) (Fi-st Amendment "a deduction from the basic American agreement that public
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage"); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971) (self-government requires free political
speech). Commentary on New York Times has recognized that express judicial adoption
of this First Amendment analysis is the major constitutional contribution of the case.
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New York Times.made another contribution to defamation law
because its functional approach led to a requirement that a specific
category of persons prove a constitutionally mandated level of cul-
pable conduct in order to recover damages. The Court recognized
that a citizen's ability to criticize governmental officials without fear
of state punishment facilitates self-government and analogized the
chilling effect20 of punishment for defamation of a public -official
to conviction for seditious libel. 21 Accordingly, the decision denied
recovery to public officials for defamation, except when they could
prove " 'actual malice'" defined as "knowing falsehood" or "reckless
disregard" of the truth.22 The New York Times majority left intact
the dominant common law standard of strict liability and presumed
damages when the plaintiff was not a public official.2 3
B. Butts and Rosenbloom: Alternative Approaches to Nonofficials
Because both the functional analysis and the actual malice standard
of New York Times were intended to protect the First Amendment
interest in criticism-of government, the decision did not define the
extent of protection for defamatory speech required when govern-
mental officials are not involved.24 The Court turned to this task in
cases following New York Times. Although the Justices agreed that
the New York Times analysis, which focused on the function of pro-
tected expression, was applicable to other cases, they could not agree
on the proper First Amendment standard to be applied to nonofficials.
See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 193-94; cf. Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1965)
(discussing relevance of Meiklejohn theory to New York Times analysis).
20. See 376 U.S. at 279 (critics of official action may be "deterred").
21. Id. at 276. The Court reasoned that a defamation action brought by a public
official is almost indistinguishable from a seditious libel prosecution for criticism of
that official's performance. The unconstitutionality of both forms of punishment "is
the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798." Id.
at 273; see Kalven, supra note 19, at 205 (emphasizing implications of Court's seditious
libel analogy for future First Amendment analysis).
22. 376 U.S. at 280; see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968) (inter-
preting "reckless disregard" to require finding that press "in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth" of published material).
23. See generally IV. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 772 (4th ed.
1971) (post-New York Times review of common law libel). To lessen the effect of these
often harsh rules, a series of conditional privileges evolved, most notably the fair comment
and public record privileges. For extended discussion of the common law privileges, see W.
PROSSER, supra, § 115, at 792; Note, supra note 6, at 905-12. Prior to New York Times,
these conditional privileges were largely ineffective as protections for the press and
therefore newspapers often found it necessary to engage in self-censorship. Z. CIKAFEE,
supra note 6, at 100-01.
24. See 376 U.S. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring in result) ("Purely private defamation
has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society....")
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In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,2 5 the Court affirmed a judgment
in favor of a university athletic director who had been accused by
the Saturday Evening Post of conspiring to fix a football game. 20 In
a companion case, Associated Press v. Talker,2 7 the Court held that
the First Amendment protected the Associated Press from liability for
printing a partially inaccurate article reporting that a retired army
general had taken command of a violent crowd opposing integration.
28
In a later decision, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,2 9 the Court ruled
in favor of a radio station that had referred to a bookseller as a "girlie
book peddler" and a "distributor of obscene material" following his
arrest on criminal obscenity charges, of which he was eventually
acquitted.80
The three approaches that emerged in these cases shared the view
that the emphasis in New York Times on the function of First Amend-
ment activity should be extended to cases involving defamation of
nonofficials. The opinions in all three cases recognized a First Amend-
ment interest in the activities* of the institutional press and empha-
sized the benefit that a self-governing society derives from uninhibited
press dissemination of opinion and information. 31 According to Jus-
tice Harlan's plurality opinion in Butts, the law of defamation, to
meet First Amendment requirements, "must neither affect 'the im-
partial distribution of news' . . . nor . . . constitute a special burden
on the press ... nor deprive our free society of the stimulating benefit
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
26. Id. at 135. Although Butts was athletic director at a state university, the Court
did not consider him a public official because he was employed by a private organization
of alumni. Id.
The Court had previously dealt with a defamation action in which plaintiff was not
a public official in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
That case, however, was decided under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970), that was intended to ensure protection of First Amendment
rights in labor disputes, 383 U.S. at 62. The Court held that because of the unique
qualities of union elections, Congress intended the "actual malice" standard to apply
to defamation in labor disputes. Id. at 62-63.
27. 388 U.S. 130 n.* (1967).
28. Id. at 140-42.
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. Id. at 32, 33-35.
31. Id. at 43-44 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (First Amendment protects all in-
formation of "public or general concern"); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
147 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940)) (First Amendment "'must embrace all issues about which information is
needed'" so that individuals can "'cope with the exigencies of their period' "); cf. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("Without the information provided
by the press most of us ... would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions
on the administration of government generally."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389
(1967) (dictum) (First Amendment "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us" because free press needed to assure "maintenance of our political
system and an open society").
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of varied ideas."' 32 The Justices disagreed, however, about the requi-
site level of First Amendment protection when the plaintiff is not a
public official. Two alternative approaches emerge from Butts. Both
the approach Justice Harlan offered in his plurality opinion3 3 and the
approach Chief Justice Warren advanced in his concurrence 34 created
"public figure" standards designed to complement the public official
category of New York Times.
The Harlan approach specifically opposed expansion of the se-
ditious libel rationale to the new public figure category, because a
private defamation action by a plaintiff who is not a governmental
official does not represent an attempt to suppress criticism of gov-
ernment.35 Justice Harlan struck a new balance of competing inter-
ests. Although he argued that the First Amendment interest remains
constant in all defamation cases, 3  Justice Harlan contended that the
legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting an individual's repu-
tation varies according to how much the plaintiff needs and deserves
such protection. Individual need depends on actual conduc3 7 since
the state interest diminishes either when the plaintiff has "sufficient
access to the means of counterargument" 38 or when he has assumed
32. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1967) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Associated Press v. Labor Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937)) (other citation omitted).
In Butts and Valher, the Court concentrated on the needs of the institutional press,
388 U.S. at 150-51; id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result) ("freedom of the
press to engage in uninhibited debate" is "crucial" to informing citizens about conduct
of public figures); cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.) (arguing society is "dependent . . . for its survival upon a
vigorous free press").
33. Three Justices agreed with Justice Harlan that a variant of a "gross negligence"
standard should apply to actions brought by public figures. 388 U.S. at 155. Chief
Justice Warren concurred in the result, basing his decision on the actual malice standard.
Id. at 165, 170 (concurring opinion). Because Justices Brennan and White agreed with
Warren that the actual malice standard applied and Justices Black and Douglas re-
iterated their absolutist position, the actual malice standard, rather than Harlan's
standard, determined the outcome. For an illuminating attempt to sort out the various
opinions in Butts, see Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendnent: Hill,
Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ci'. REv. 267, 275-78.
34. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 167 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring
in result).
35. Id. at 153 (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) ("In New York Times we were ad-
judicating in an area which lay close to seditious libel."); id. at 154 ("These actions
cannot be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel."); see Kalven, supra note 33,
at 282 (seditious libel rationale not relevant).
36. See pp. 1728-29 and notes 31 & 32 sufpra (constant First Amendment interest in
institutional press). Justice Harlan's definition of a public figure retreated from this
Niew, however, by requiring that a press report concern a judicially determined "public
controiersy" in order to receive First Amendment protection. 388 U.S. at 155 (plurality
opinion of Harlan, J.).
37. Id. at 154 (public figure category necessary "to determine whether [plaintiff]
has a legitimate call on the court for protection in light of his prior activities and
means of self-defense").
38. Id. at 155.
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the risk of defamation by "thrusting... his personality into the 'vortex'
of an important public controversy." 30 The Harlan approach would
classify a plaintiff meeting either of these conditions as a "public
figure," and would hold the press liable only for breach of a standard
of care much like gross negligence whenever such a plaintiff brought
a defamation suit.40
By contrast, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the actual malice
standard of New York Times must apply to public figures as well as
to public officials. The Chief Justice carried the New York Times
seditious libel rationale an additional step and argued that large pri-
vate concentrations of political and economic power cause "individu-
als . . . who do not hold public office at the moment" to be "ulti-
mately involved in the resolution of important public questions."''4
Thus the Warren approach would define a public figure by his status
as an individual whose societal influence approaches that of a public
official. 42
The Rosenbloom approach, stated for a plurality of three by Jus-
tice Brennan,43 rejected both the Harlan and Warren public figure
standards. The plurality specifically repudiated Justice Harlan's con-
tention that the state interest varies with the category of plaintiff44
and further insisted that "a distinction between 'public' and 'private'
figures makes no sense" 45 as a device to resolve First Amendment
issues. In addition, Justice Brennan rejected Chief Justice Warren's
39. Id. Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967),
elucidated his reasons for believing private individuals are entitled to greater state pro-
tection than public figures. "It would be unreasonable to assume" that a private indi-
vidual "could find a forum for making a successful refutation" of defamatory statements.
Id. at 407-08. A private individual comes "to public attention through an unfortunate
circumstance not of his making" and "can in no sense be considered to have 'waived'
any protection the State might justifiably afford him." Id. at 409. The adoption of this
premise for retaining the public figure standard in Gertz is described at p. 1733 infra.
40. 388 U.S. at 155 (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.).
41. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). Compare pp. 1729-30 & note 37
supra (Justice Harlan's public figure category focused on plaintiff's activity as opposed
to his status).
42. Neither the Harlan nor the Warren approach limits First Amendment protection
to publication of expressly political information. Butts dealt with the nonpolitical sub-
ject of college football. For examples of cases protecting press dissemination of both
political and nonpolitical information outside the field of defamation, see Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (state law prohibiting newspaper dissemination of
abortion advertising unconstitutional); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966)
(state law limiting newspapers' ability to endorse political candidates unconstitutional).
43. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). There was no opinion of
the Court. Justice Brennan spoke for himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
Id. at 30. Justices Black and White concurred in the result only. Id. at 57.
44. Id. at 46 (asserting public official standard did not reflect determination that
"public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in
private life").
45. Id. at 45-46.
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approach, which predicated constitutional protection on the status of
the particular plaintiff, as an impermissibly narrow definition of the
First Amendment interest.46 Regardless of the conduct or character
of the plaintiff, the Rosenbloom approach concluded that the First
Amendment required application of the actual malice standard of
the New York Times case whenever a matter of "public or general
interest" 47 is involved.
C. The Gertz Standard: A New Category for Public Figures
The failure of the Rosenbloom Court to reach a majority decision
created a dilemma for lower courts confronted with three alternative
statements of the constitutionally required standard for adjudicating
defamation claims.4 8 The resulting confusion led the Court in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.49 to attempt to formulate a new standard-one
that blended elements of all three prior approaches. In that case the
plaintiff, an attorney, had been retained by the parents of a youth
allegedly killed by a policeman to bring a civil action against the
accused policeman. In investigating an alleged plot to undermine
police authority, a John Birch Society magazine, without attempting to
check the truth of the claims being made, published a contributed
article that falsely identified Gertz as a " 'Communist-fronter' " and
a " 'Leninist.' "O The Supreme Court reversed a ruling for the maga-
zine based on both the Rosenbloom "public interest" and Warren
"public figure" standards. 51 Announcing a new constitutional stan-
dard,52 it held that Gertz was not a public figure.
46. Id. at 43. ("The public's primary interest is in the event. .")
47. Id.
48. Several courts, including the court of appeals in Rosenbloom, had anticipated the
plurality opinion by adopting a "public interest" test in order to determine when the
actual malice standard applied. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858,
862 (5th Cir. 1970); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969),
aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); cf. Note, The
Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE
L.J. 642, 644-45 (1966) (arguing Court should adopt "public interest" standard). Even
after Rosenbloom, several lower courts continued to apply some variant of the public
figure standard. See, e.g., Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 410 US. 984 (1973) (newspaper publisher is public figure).
49. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. at 328-32; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd,
418 U.S. 323 (1974). The district court had determined initially that the actual malice stan-
dard did not apply to a private individual, but later set aside the jury's verdict under
application of a "public interest" standard. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp.
997 (N.D. Il. 1970), aff'd, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. 418 U.S. at 343-48.
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Although the media defendant was held liable, Gertz extended First
Amendment protection beyond the limits of prior cases. The Court
made explicit the premise of all three post-New York Times approaches
that the activities of the institutional press deserve some minimum
level of protection from the threat of libel judgments. 5 Gertz re-
jected the common law practices of strict liability and of presumed
damages. 4 The Court adopted a fault standard as the minimum level
of culpable conduct in all actions against the press55 and limited
damage awards to compensation for "actual injury"5 6 in most cases in
order to reduce their chilling effect on press activity, T Gertz, like New
York Times, recognized that the chilling effect produced by fear of
large damage awards may induce the press to avoid potential liability
and that, therefore, some protection of defamatory speech is necessary
to prevent the inhibition of protected press activity.5s
The Court, however, rejected Rosenbloom's assertion that the cate-
gory of plaintiff is irrelevant and embraced instead a refinement of
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (finding strict liability
and presumed damages inconsistent with press freedom "grounded in the constitutional
command of the First Amendment").
54. See note 23 supra (discussing common law doctrine).
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). The fault requirement
protects press dissemination of information and opinion by vindicating the press in all
cases where the statement does not make "substantial danger to reputation apparent."
Id. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (plurality
opinion of Harlan, J.)). It thus focuses a court's attention on objective press conduct
rather than on the content of published material, see pp. 1739-43 infra, and pre-
sumably defines fault as press activity inconsistent with accepted standards of quality
journalism. See 418 U.S. at 348 (implying press not negligent when published information
"did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential").
Although the Court did not explicitly advocate the fault standard, it held that states
must not "impose liability without fault" as they "define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability." Id. at 347. Several states considering the question have adopted a
fault standard. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975);
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 168-69 (Mass. 1975). Several
states have adopted either a "gross negligence" standard or some other modified version
of Rosenbloom. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457-58
(Colo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Chapadeau v. Utica Obserier-Dispatch, Inc.,
38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). It appears that
some jurisdictions have adopted the actual malice standard without modification. See,
e.g., Hatter v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., No. CA 8298-75, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 15, 1976); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
321 N.E.2d 580, 586-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). Although
a state clearly has the power to adopt an "actual malice" or "gross negligence" standard
for all defamation actions, it is questionable whether a state is permitted to differentiate
between matters of public and nonpublic interest in applying that standard in light of
Gertz. See pp. 1733-34 infra.
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
57. Id. at 349 ("[Tjhe doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish un-
popular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury.") But see note 122
inIra (assessing success of actual injury standard).
58. 418 U.S. at 340 ("[P]unishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.")
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the public figure category advanced in the Harlan and Warren ap-
proaches. The Gertz Court incorporated both alternative definitions
from Butts into one public figure standard.59 The first branch of the
Gertz public figure standard, derived from the Warren approach, in-
cludes those who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and influ-
ence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes."' 0 The
second branch of the standard, based on the Harlan approach, en-
compasses those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of par-
ticular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved."' Under Gertz, a public figure, so defined, must
show actual malice in order to recover damages.
Although Gertz adopted both definitions, it premised the need for
a public figure category solely on Justice Harlan's concept of a fluc-
tuating level of legitimate state interest in reputation;2 rather than
on Chief Justice Warren's expansion of the seditious libel rationale.
The Court accepted Harlan's premise that the state interest diminishes
when the plaintiff is a public figure.: First, public figures have ac-
cess to media, which afford them "self-help" to "contradict the lie or
correct the error and thereby minimize its adverse impact on repu-
tation."' 4 In addition, public figures "invite attention and comment" 6
and thereby assume the risk of press scrutiny.00 The "private person,"
however, "has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection
of his own good name"0 7 and is "not only more vulnerable to injury"0' 8
but also "more deserving of recovery."0 9 For this reason, Gertz con-
cluded that application of the Rosenbloom "public interest" standard
to private persons as well as to public figures "would abridge this
legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable."'70
59. The Court also asserted that certain individuals are public figures "through no
purposeful action" of their own, although it conceded "the instances of truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id. at 345.
60. Id. Although Gertz seems to suggest that these individuals are likely to have
access to self-help remedies, id. at 344, the definition requires inquiry into the public
figure's "power" and "influence" rather than his ability to mitigate damages.
61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. at 341 (legitimate state interest is "the compensation of individuals for the
harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood").
63. Id. at 344.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 345.
66. Id. at 344 (public figure, like public official, "must accept certain necessary con-
sequences of [his] involvement in public affairs" and "runs the risk of closer public
scrutiny").
67. Id. at 345.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 346.
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The Court's analysis of the state's legitimate interest in protecting
individual reputation did not undertake to define precisely the "harm
inflicted",' on individuals by "defamatory falsehood." '72 Although
Gertz did reemphasize that "[t]he right of a man to the protection
of his own reputation' ' 73 springs from " 'our basic concept of the es-
sential dignity and worth of every human being,' "4 it did not offer
a detailed analysis of the state interest in providing a remedy for the
intrusion on individual rights caused by defamation. This contrasts
with the Court's relatively precise articulation of the countervailing
First Amendment interests. 75 The Gertz analysis did provide, how-
ever, a determination of situations in which the state interest di-
minishes to a point where there is less need to inhibit First Amend-
ment activity through defamation laws.
II. The Public Figure Standard: Reputation and the Press
The Gertz public figure standard attempts to reconcile a fluctuat-
ing level of state interest in individual reputation with the mandate
of the First Amendment. Although the Court ostensibly adopted the
Harlan premise for constructing a public figure category, it failed to
seize upon Justice Harlan's most significant insight: the constancy
of the First Amendment interest in defamation cases. The remainder
of this Note will examine this First Amendment interest, analyze
71. Id. at 341. For previous attempts to characterize the individual privacy interests at
stake, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135 (1967) (plurality opinion
of Harlan, J.); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63-64 (1966).
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). One commentator has ac-
knowledged that the tort of defamation "has usually been defined very broadly as to
encompass any kind of statement that would adversely affect or discredit a person in the
estimation of reasonable people generally." Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the
Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (1976). For an example of scholarly disagreement as to
the interests involved in the underlying value of privacy, compare Kalven, Privacy in
Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 329
(1966) ("One may perhaps wonder if the tort is not an anachronism, a nineteenth century
response to the mass press which is hardly in keeping with the more robust tastes or
mores of today.") (footnote omitted) with Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003 (1964) ("The injury
is to our individuality, to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents a
social vindication of the human spirit thus threatened rather than a recompense for
loss suffered.")
73. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
74. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
75. It appears that the individual interest in reputation is inherently difficult to define
precisely. See note 71 supra; cf. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY
182, 192-93 (NOMOS XIII J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (privacy concept fosters
"imprecise analysis of legal issues").
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the failure of the Gertz public figure standard to protect it, and pro-
pose an alternative standard designed to accommodate more effec-
tively competing First Amendment and state interests in the law of
defamation.
A. Recognition of the Selection and Packaging Function
The Gertz opinion demonstrates the Court's concern that defama-
tion liability rules may interfere with press exercise of editorial dis-
cretion.7 6 This editorial function has been recognized as a vital process
that is protected by the First Amendment.7 7 In Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo,T decided on the same day as Gertz, the Court
held that a state statute granting persons criticized in the press a
right to reply violated the First Amendment. The Court determined
that "the choice of material to go into a newspaper and the decisions
made as to . . . content and treatment of public issues constitutes
the exercise of editorial control and judgment" 9 and that the First
Amendment forbids interference with this editorial process.
The relevance of editorial discretion to defamation law can be dem-
onstrated by a more detailed analysis of the important First Amend-
ment interest in what might be described as the selection and packag-
ing function of the institutional press. The selection and packaging
function is the process by which the press selects certain facts from
all available information and packages them for dissemination to the
public.80 In addition to selection and exclusion of data, the function
includes determination of which selected information will be pre-
sented prominently and which will be "buried" within a publication,
a page, or an article.8 '
76. See pp. 1737-38 infra.
77. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 391 (1973) (dictum) ("[W]e reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial
judgment."); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
124 (1973) ("For better or worse, editing is what editors are for, and editing is se-
lection and choice of material."); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 975 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1483 (1978) (No. 77-1105) ("[The First Amendment requires that
we afford a privilege to .. . a journalist's exercise of editorial control and judgment.")
78. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
79. Id. at 258. Surprisingly, the Gertz majority does not discuss Miami Herald. The
only consideration of the case's relevance appears in a brief footnote in Justice White's
dissent, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 401 n.43 (1974), and in a reference
to that footnote in the majority opinion. Id. at 347 n.10.
80. A newspaper, for example, has been defined as "the result of a whole series
of selections as to what items shall be printed, in what position they shall be printed,
how much space each shall occupy, what emphasis each shall have." W. LiI'P.ANN,
PUBLIC OPINIo N 354 (1922).
81. Selection and packaging decisions are implicit in the daily assignment of reporters,
the structure of an individual story, the design of a specific page, and the distribution
of information among pages. "Newsmen traditionally arrange the information in news
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Press exercise of the selection and packaging function is integral
to the First Amendment interests articulated in New York Times
because it assists the individual in his attempt to make informed
choices. It does so by relieving the citizen of the time-consuming task
of sifting through all available data, maximizing the interest of dis-
seminated material, making important links between political and
more general information, and attempting to circumvent internalized
mechanisms that often prevent an individual from exposing himself
to new information.8 2 By including both political and nonpolitical
data in the information package, the press increases the probability
that the individual citizen will use such information in making po-
litical choices.83 The press is able to achieve these results by basing
selection and packaging decisions on the subtle interplay of the
probable interest of the audience,84 the timeliness of the issue or
stories in an 'inverted pyramid' style, the most newsworthy bits first, followed in de-
scending order by details of lesser significance." In addition, there is the "lead" or first
paragraph of a story, designed to "arrest ...attention" and to give the "busy reader"
the most salient information "without forcing him to wade through columns of print."
L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS 73 (1973).
Although this Note focuses on the print medium, the selection and packaging function
is exercised by electronic as well as print journalists. There are, nevertheless, differences
inherent in the technology, economics and regulation of each medium that affect the
manner in which the selection and packaging function is exercised. See generally Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Coase, The Federal Communications Com-
mission, 2 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1959); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Ob-
serJations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
82. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
1483 (1978) (No. 77-1105) ("The media is not a conduit which receives information and,
senselessly, spews it forth. The active exercise of human judgment must transform the
raw data of reportage into a finished product."); Mayo, The Free Forum, 22 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 387, 393 (1954) (journalists are "[s]pecialists in the collection and processing of
news and specialists in the interpretation of facts as related to the contextual pattern
from which they arise") [hereinafter cited as Free Forum]. For discussion of internalized
barriers to information reception, see generally J. BEST, PUBLIC OPINION 34-45 (1973); L.
MILBRATH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 35-46 (1972); Mayo, The Limited Forum, 22 Gro.
WASH. L. REv. 261, 284-92 (1954) (social and psychological phenomena contribute to
tendency to avoid exposure to politically relevant information).
83. See Free Forum, supra note 82, at 410 n.54 (press selects and packages information
"apportioned between sufficient reader or listener interest items to attract and hold an
audience and those items which are of less exciting nature" but of direct political im-
port). This analysis places a premium on the effective dissemination of information. See
Mayo, The Limited Forum, supra note 82, at 279 ("[TIhe efficiency of communications ...
must be measured, not in terms of the volume of facts disseminated, but by the degree
to which such communication facilitates rational [judgments by citizens].")
84. See Free Forum, supra note 82, at 410.
It has been claimed that capitalism, with its stress on profit maximization, has led
the press to overemphasize the audience interest criterion in making selection and packag-
ing decisions. See, e.g., THE COMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND REsPON-
SIBLE PRESS 55-57 (1947). Although "in times of financial stringency . .. constraints on
resources impinge most noticeably on newsmen," L. SICAL, supra note 81, at 10, in most
circumstances major press outlets "relegate profitability to the place of ultimate-and
remote-test of success or failure. So long as revenues are sufficient to ensure organiza-
tional survival, professional and social objectives take precedence over profits." Id. at 8.
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event, su and the potential consequences of the issue's resolution to the
relevant community.8 6
The Gertz majority, in restricting the Rosenbloom public interest
standard, suggested that the Rosenbloom test effectively required courts
to interfere with exercise of the selection and packaging function.
The Court stated that the press, not the "conscience of judges,"8 T
must determine "'what information is relevant to self-government' "s
In fact, financial incentives serve to facilitate potential information reception. By making
the information package sufficiently attractive for people to "buy" it, the audience
interest criterion increases the likelihood that citizens will be exposed to and read po-
litically relevant information.
85. See Free Forum, supra note 82, at 403-04 (timeliness criterion "pertains to the
most propitious moment for the presentation of specific issues so as to maximize the
gainful impact of the discussion").
86. These selection and packaging criteria have been institutionalized by the press
in the form of journalistic "conventions." Perhaps the most pervasive of these is that of
"objective reporting." F. SiEBERT, T. PETERSON & AV. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE
PRESS 60 (1956). Another is " 'balance'-making news columns accessible to various sides
in a political controversy." L. SIGAL, SuPra note 81, at 68. Thus the press has developed a
s)stem for choosing from among available information that which accurately reflects all
facets of a particular event or controversy, and for presenting that information in a
manner that indicates the comparative weight of conflicting positions. Even in editorial
pages, there is an effort by the press to achieve a balance among various viewpoints. Id.
87. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
88. Id. This phrase is borrowed from Justice Marshall's Rosenbloom dissent, which
dealt with the question at some length:
In order for a particular defamation to come within the privilege there must be
a determination that the event was of legitimate public interest. . . .But assuming
that . .. courts are not simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial
portion of the population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts will be re-
quired to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or sub-
ject; what information is relevant to self-government .... The danger such a doctrine
portends for freedom of the press seems apparent.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ci-
tation omitted); cf. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
98 S. Ct. 1483 (1978) (No. 77-1105) (claiming that "ratio decidendi for Sullivan's restraints
on libel suits is the concern that the exercise of editorial judgment would be chilled");
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Though Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1415 n.264 (1975) (claiming Court
failed to make clear its premise that "the news media ought not to be put to the
task of assessing whether a court would ultimately find its news report to be in the
public interest"). Justice Brennan, although conceding that judicial determinations of
the public interest in an event "would not always be easy," argued in his Gertz dissent
that "surely the courts, the ultimate arbiters of all disputes concerning clashes of con-
stitutional values, would only be performing one of their traditional functions in un-
dertaking this duty." 418 U.S. at 369.
Lower court decisions have echoed the Gertz criticism of Rosenbloom. See, e.g., Cahill
v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 536 n.6, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366 n.6 (1975).
The suggestion that the vagueness of the Rosenbloom rule inhibits the press has been
dismissed because "[p]ractically speaking . . . there is little indication that courts are
prone to restrict what the media may publish." Note, The Expanding Constitutional
Protection of the News Media Fron Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the
New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1572 (1972). The several cases decided under
Rosenbloom that found published information not to be of "public concern" cast doubt
on this view. See note 98 infra (citing cases).
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and worthy of publication. Thus the Court appears to have endorsed
the view that there is a constant First Amendment interest in the
selection and packaging function, an interest that does not fluctuate
with judicial determination of the importance of particular informa-
tion. Unfortunately, Gertz did not explain more fully why interfer-
ence with the selection and packaging function in defamation cases
may violate the First Amendment.89 The scant attention paid in Gertz
to defining this First Amendment interest explains the Court's failure
to realize that its own public figute standard creates equally serious
threats to selection and packaging. Examination of the way in which
Gertz interferes with selection and packaging, and of the degree to
which such interference is unnecessary, demonstrates the need for
revision of the public figure standard.
B. Interference with the Selection and Packaging Function
The Gertz public figure standard, like the Harlan, Warren, and
Rosenbloom approaches before it, interferes to an unnecessary extent
with press exercise of the selection and packaging function: it re-
quires both judicial inquiries beyond the competence of courts and
subjective determinations based on the content of published infor-
mation. Moreover, the Gertz standard invites the press to defer me-
chanically to prior judicial decisions when deciding what information
to publish, and it is so vague that the press is unable to predict its
application in particular fact situations.
Although Gertz purports to reject the Rosenbloom requirement that
courts ascertain whether published information is of "public interest"
before it receives First Amendment protection, the decision actually
requires similar judicial inquiries in the application of its public
figure standard. By adopting a standard that combines both the Harlan
and Warren alternatives, Gertz sanctions interference with the selec-
tion and packaging function almost identical to that caused by Rosen-
bloom. The Harlan public figure definition, as adopted in Gertz, re-
89. The editorial functions of tile press are often subsumed in judicial discussion
of other, more visible press activity. An example of more "obvious" press activity that
has received judicial recognition and protection is the process by which the press ac-
tively seeks out and collects information for publication. Compare New York Times Co.
". United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (prior restraint cannot prevent publication of
stolen documents procured by press) and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(dictum) ("Vithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.") with Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (press not entitled
to "special access to information not shared by members of the public generally"). See
generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838
(1971); Note, The Right of the Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 HhRv. L. REv.
1505 (1974).
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quires courts to determine whether particular information concerns
a legitimate "public controversy." 90 The Warren public figure defi-
nition, at least as lower courts have interpreted Gertz, requires ju-
dicial decisions as to the newsworthiness of each individual plaintiff.9 '
In both instances courts must evaluate the content of published ma-
terial and determine whether it is the kind of information the public
needs to know.92
1. Limitations on Judicial Scrutiny
The judicial content determinations required under Gertz are be-
yond the institutional competence of courts and are better left to pro-
fessional journalists trained in selecting and packaging information
for publication. 3 Journalists evaluate all available information in con-
90. See p. 1733 supra. There is little doubt that the Gertz public figure standard
is "a Rosenbloom question masquerading in a Butts disguise." Eaton, supra note 88,
at 1425. Although "'[p]articipation in a public controversy' is not exactly a twin-sister
of Rosenbloom's 'involvement in a matter of public concern,' " the two standards are
"close enough to be first cousins." Id. at 1423. This family resemblance has been recog-
nized by the courts. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 175
n.27 (D.D.C. 1977) ("In Gertz, the Court sought to relieve courts of the responsibility
for determining the public interest in the context of libel suits, but nonetheless referred
to a 'public figure' as an individual who involves himself in a 'public controversy. ")
(emphasis in original). In fact, some lower courts have interpreted Gertz as calling for
a Rosen bloomn-like determination of "public interest" as a necessary condition precedent
to any individual being termed a public figure. See Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp.
1314, 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Korbar v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641, 357 N.E.2d 135,
138-39 (1976).
91. See p. 1733 supra & note 99 infra (citing cases).
92. It should be emphasized that any defamation liability rule will interfere with
the selection and packaging function to some extent. Since the criteria on which selection
and packaging decisions are made operate so as to maximize the effective transmission
of information, the introduction by the legal system of other criteria, designed to mini-
mize injury to reputation, is certain to diminish the effectiveness of the resulting in-
formation package. But see pp. 1750-51 infra (liability rule minimizes interference with
selection and packaging function).
An alternative standard not requiring judicial content evaluation would declare the
plaintiff a public figure whenever he has received substantial prior press coverage. See
note 109 infra (citing cases). Application of this standard would substantially chill press
exercise of the selection and packaging function in all cases involving an individual's
initial attraction of press attention. In addition, such a standard does not recognize that
some individuals subject to media scrutiny may be entitled to state protection. For these
reasons, a prior press coverage standard fails to balance the competing interests ade-
quately.
93. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1113, vacated, 516 F.2d
1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) ("Choices have to be made and,
assuming that the area is one of protected expression, the choices must be made by
those whose mission it is to inform, not by those who must rule.") There is ample
evidence that "[flournalism is a profession no less than the law," which involves "knowl-
edge and experience not normally available to the populace at large." Anderson, A
Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power, 54 Tex. L. REV.
271, 277 n.21 (1976). This professionalism has reflected itself in an ethic of social respon-
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structing the publication package that is ultimately disseminated 4 and
explicitly balance political information with other material designed
to attract readers and to hold their attention.9" Courts are not trained
or experienced in the task of editing a newspaper.90 Yet the Gertz
standard requires courts to examine a discrete piece of information
and to make an isolated judgment about its First Amendment value.
The judiciary as an institution is not competent to determine whether,
as part of a comprehensive information package, an individual piece
of information will serve the First Amendment interest in rational
decisionmaking by citizens. 97 Furthermore, as the cases following Rosen-
bloom 9s and Gertz99 illustrate, unfortunate results often flow from
sibility for providing relevant and effectively presented information to the citizenry.
F. SIEBERT, T. PETERSON & W. SCHRAMM, supra note 86, at 74; Free Forum, supra note
82, at 393.
94. See p. 1735 supra.
95. A failure to recognize the dynamics of selection and packaging appears to be a
major flaw of the so-called "public speech" theory of the First Amendment that ex-
pressly "requires distinguishing between events the knowledge of which contribute to
the formation of public opinion necessary to effective self-government" and those that
do not. D. Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v.
Sullivan, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 819, 827 (1975); see Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the
Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEx. L. REv. 630,
636 (1968) (advocating similar judicial determinations).
96. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1153, vacated, 516 F.2d
1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (claiming
"[flournalists may be stifled if they are steered from the way in which their profession
looks at things, and channeled to another way, which however [congenial] to men of
the law" is foreign to those whose profession it is to communicate).
97. See Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions
on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REv. 107, 113 (1963) (even press appears unable to
agree on objective definition of "newsworthy").
Attempts by the Federal Communications Commission to assess the fairness of news
and public affairs broadcasts may also suffer from a lack of institutional competence.
See, e.g., Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (FCC decision that Com-
munism does not constitute controversial issue); Dr. Benjamin Spock Peoples Party, 38
F.C.C.2d 316, 318 (1972) (opinions of fringe party political candidates not of public
importance); J.F. Branigan, 31 F.C.C.2d 490, 491 (1971) (discussion of international
affairs not directly involving United States not controversial). For discussion of First
Amendment problems of FCC content review, see generally B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS Vs. PUBLIC AccEss (1976); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications
Press, 1975 DuKE L. REV. 213.
98. Compare Twenty-Five East 40th St. Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 595, 282
N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972) (quality of restaurant food is matter of public interest)
with Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 383-84, 192 S.E.2d 737, 742-43,
rev'd, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (refusal of workers to join labor union not matter of public
interest). For a detailed compilation of lower court cases decided under the public
interest standard and their results, see Justice White's dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377 n.10 (1974).
99. Under the Gertz "persuasive power" category, compare Atkins v. Friedman, 49
A.D.2d 852, 374 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1975) (author of diet books has achieved pervasive fame),
and Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1976) (television star is
prominent in society), with Lawlor v. Gallagher President's Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp.
721, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (corporate executive has achieved no general fame). This result
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judicial intervention in the realm of selection and packaging. 100
Judicial content determinations are necessarily subjective. Under
Gertz a decision whether a plaintiff is a public figure must be made
in order to determine the appropriate standard of liability. Yet the
lack of discernible guidelines for decision leads courts to make public
figure determinations on the basis of the liability result they desire.' 0 '
Lower courts are left free to weigh their own subjective determina-
tion of the "worth" of a particular piece of published information 02
against their evaluation of the merit of an individual defamation
claim. Thus the Gertz standard requires courts to base First Amend-
ment adjudication on the content of expression. 03 Because of the
threat of political abuse, courts have traditionally held that the First
Amendment forbids such content-based standards. 0 4
is somewhat ironic in view of the fact that Chief Justice Warren predicated erection
of the public figure category largely on the concentration of power in the private sector
and the need of the public to be informed on the activities of those who wield that
power. See p. 1730 suPra.
Under the Gertz "public controversy" category, compare General Motors Corp. v. Piskor,
27 Md. App. 95, 112, 340 A.2d 767, 779 (1975) (scuffles between auto workers and plant
security guards not public controversy) and Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d
85, 89 (Okla. 1976) (condition of animals in privately owned pet shop not public con-
troversy) with Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(dispute over friendships of Ernest Hemingway public controversy) and Bandelin v.
Pietsch, 563 P.2d 395, 398 (Idaho), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 266 (1977) (management of ad-
mittedly obscure decedent's small estate by former political figure is public controversy).
100. In many post-Gertz public figure cases cited in this Note, the defendant is not
the institutional press. Nonetheless, these decisions under the public figure standard add
to the body of judicial precedent that interferes with press exercise of the selection and
packaging function.
101. A standard that sought to protect politically relevant information might require
that, in order to be protected under the actual malice standard, expression must include
discussion of pending legislation. Cf. Bork, supra note 19, at 20 (arguing that only ex-
plicitly political information is protected under First Amendment). Such a standard could
be applied neutrally in all like cases and would present no vagueness problem. None-
theless, such a rule would be unacceptably narrow because it would leave much infor-
mnation of clear political relevance unprotected and would ignore the contribution of
the selection and packaging function to political decisionmaking.
102. The often bitter judicial division evident in and among many libel cases gen-
erally has its source not in disagreement over legal principles but in application of
those principles in assessing the importance of a particular piece of information. See, e.g.,
Francis v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 262 La. 875, 265 So. 2d 206 (1972) (majority and dissent-
ing opinions disagreed whether bond forfeiture proceeding is matter of public interest).
Compare Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
424 U.S. 448 (1976) (divorce not matter of public interest) with Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460
F.2d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 1972) (in case involving same divorce, but different publication,
opposite conclusion reached).
103. See Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Con-
flicting Approaches, 75 Micr. L. REv. 43, 55 (1976) (criticizing Gertz because "courts
simply should not, in a free society, take it upon themselves to determine what is
newsworthy").
104. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But, above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-
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2. Chilling Effect on Press Editorial Functions
Judicial determinations of the merit of particular information un-
der Gertz adds to a growing body of precedent defining what infor-
mation concerns a "public controversy" or discusses individuals of
"power and influence." These precedents tend to replace specific edi-
torial decisions by the press in individual cases. Hence the courts and
not the press make what become controlling selection and packaging
decisions. The chilling effect of potential liability leads the press to
defer to these precedents in determining what information to dis-
seminate and how to present it.1°5 Journalistic criteria designed to
maximize relevance and impact are replaced by rules derived from
this expanding body of case law. The libel attorney, who plays a
prominent role in many publication decisions, 10 reinforces the sig-
nificance of these precedents for the press.
The vagueness of standards such as "public controversy" and "per-
suasive power" exacerbates this chilling effect. Gertz failed to define
these terms adequately and to provide specific criteria for lower courts
to apply in particular cases. The reasoning of individual decisions
varies so much that the press has an incentive to avoid potential lia-
bility in factual settings even remotely similar to those of prior ad-
judications.107 The Gertz standard does not alleviate the problems
ject matter, or its content."). Although they are generally less politically motivated, it
would appear that courts, as a part of the government, should be limited by the same
restrictions. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
1483 (1978) (No. 77-1105) (asserting that judicial, as opposed to legislative, interference with
editorial function "does not reduce the grave implications for the vitality of the editorial
process"). But see Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66-70 (1976)
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (courts make content distinctions in deciding First Amendment
questions involving unprotected utterances such as defamation); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-70 (1976) (Court
replaces "commercial speech" doctrine with test that looks to "public interest" of in-
formation involved).
105. See p. 1732 supra (chilling effect).
106. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422, 438-41 (1975)
(prominent role of attorney in press publication decisions).
107. In his concurring opinion in Rosenbloom, Justice White claimed he was "not
aware" of any instance of the press "tread[ing] too gingerly." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971) (White, J., concurring). But see AAFCO Heating & Air Condi-
tioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) ("Publishers, fearful of being unable to prove the truth of
their statements, would avoid the publication of controversial articles."); Franklin, supra
note 97, at 142 (potential defamation liability "much more harmful than threats to free-
dom of action in other areas because it is so easy for the press to skirt 'trouble' by com-
pletely avoiding any possibly sensitive area"). For the claim of a lawyer/journalist that
the chilling effect is a very real threat to the press, see Anderson, supra note 106, at 430.
Awards made by lower courts in cases that have reached the Supreme Court demon-
strate that libel judgments may be substantial. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 40 (1971) (Rosenbloom awarded S750,000); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 138, 141 (1967) (Butts awarded $460,000 and Walker received $500,000);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (Sullivan awarded $500,000).
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confronted by courts under Rosen bloom. 0 Several post-Gertz opinions
have complained of the difficulties inherent in making a public figure
determination.109
Moreover, although Gertz claims to fix an appropriate level of le-
gitimate state interest, its adoption of both the Harlan and Warren
public figure definitions belies that assertion. Rather than formulating
a standard that varies the level of protection afforded individual repu-
tation with the probability of harm,110 Gertz makes protection de-
pend on the influence of the plaintiff or on the degree of controversy
inherent in the situation. Any incentive given the press to avoid lia-
bility should arise when harm is more probable, not when a court
decides information is not sufficiently important to merit publication.
C. Time, Inc. v. Firestone: The Public Figure Standard Applied
The failure of Gertz to recognize threats to the selection and pack-
aging function that are inherent in its public figure standard is dem-
onstrated by Time, Inc. v. Firestone,"' the Court's most recent libel
decision. Firestone involved a Time magazine report that Mary Alice
and Russel Firestone were divorced "on grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultery." 1 2 Although substantial evidence of adultery was in-
troduced at trial, this was not a ground of decision. In Mrs. Fire-
stone's defamation action, the court found Time guilty of "journalis-
tic negligence."" 3 The Supreme Court upheld the state court in al-
most all respects but remanded for a more conclusive record to sup-
port the finding of fault." 4
Because the Court found that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure,
Time was not protected under the actual malice standard. The Court
decided without comment that Mrs. Firestone did not possess the "es-
pecial prominence" necessary to make her a public figure under the
108. See note 88 supra (citing cases).
109. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga.
1976) ("Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.") For
other admissions of judicial frustration, see Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542
F.2d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1976); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 172
(D.D.C. 1977); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Not
surprisingly, several post-Gertz courts have based a public figure determination on the
fact of media publicity itself. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D.D.C. 1976); Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1333
(W.D. Pa. 1974). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (media publicity
alone not sufficient to create public figure).
110. See p. 1733 supra (explaining that this is premise of Gertz public figure standard).
111. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
112. The entire story is reprinted in the opinion of the Court. Id. at 452.
113. Id. at 463.
114. Id. at 464.
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Warren definition." 5 The majority then determined that the plain-
tiff's involvement in a divorce proceeding did not constitute involve-
ment in a "public controversy."" 6 Although the Firestone divorce
was a "cause clbre,"17 the Court held that to define public contro-
versy as "all controversies of interest to the public" would "reinstate
the doctrine advanced in [Rosenbloom]."" 8
This application of the public figure standard illustrates its inter-
ference with the selection and packaging function. The Supreme Court
analyzed the content of particular information and held it unworthy
of First Amendment protection, although it was at least arguable that
the activities of a powerful industrialist have some political signifi-
cance. The particular information published might also have been
relevant to more general political debate concerning divorce or de-
terioration of the family unit. In addition, the majority acknowledged
that the information involved was of some public interest. Time may
have made a selection and packaging decision that this information
was likely to attract readers to the magazine as part of an information
package that would effectively present information," 9 including ma-
terial of direct political significance. 20
Nevertheless, the press is now aware of a determination by the
Supreme Court that the divorce of a wealthy and powerful individual
115. Id. at 453. Firestone did not address the question of how the Gertz standard is
to be applied when two individuals are involved in a press report, one of whom is
a public figure. It is likely that Mr. Firestone qualifies as a public figure under the
persuasive power category. The Warren rationale for that category, see p. 1730 supra,
suggests that when such an individual is involved the public is entitled to press dis-
semination of information concerning him regardless of who brings the defamation
action. In Firestone, however, the Court held that because Mrs. Firestone was not a
public figure in her own right, the press was not privileged to report information con-
cerning her husband. See note 147 infra (treatment of such multiple participant reports
under proposed standard).
116. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See pp. 1736-37 supra (importance of audience attraction criterion to selection and
packaging function). To point out that information that attracts readers facilitates po-
tential reception of more politically relevant information is not to suggest that infor-
mation is protected speech simply because it attracts an audience. In fact, the premise
of this analysis is that the information is defamatory and thus not itself protected by
the First Amendment. The point is that publication of such information is integral
to press exercise of the selection and packaging function, an activity that is entitled to
a measure of First Amendment protection.
120. See pp. 1736-37 supra (selection and packaging function may involve publication
of both political and nonpolitical information). For example, the issue of Time that
contained the report of the Firestone divorce also included extensive information on
the Vietnam War, discussion of President Johnson's re-election prospects, and an ap-
praisal of the performance of the just-concluded 90th Congress. TME, Dec. 22, 1967,
at 15-18.
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is not a public controversy. 121 Because of the threat of large damage
awards now inherent in publication of similar stories,122 the press will
have an incentive to apply this precedent mechanically to override a
selection and packaging decision. Because of the vagueness of the
public controversy standard the press will hesitate to publish items
dealing with related topics, such as the extra-marital affairs and social
ties of powerful individuals, whether or not a judicial resolution would
ultimately favor the press.' 23
III. Tort Principles and Public Figures:
An Alternative Standard
Recognition of the selection and packaging function highlights the
substantial and constant First Amendment interest present in all
defamation cases. Although Harlan's approach suggested that such a
constant interest exists, his requirement of a judicially determined
"public controversy" would imply that the interest may vary from
case to case. Similarly, although Gertz found that Rosenbloom varied
impermissibly the magnitude of the First Amendment interest ac-
cording to the content of published information, the Gertz standard
varies that interest with both the extent of controversy inherent in
published information and the status of the plaintiff.12 4 This Note
contends that a public figure standard designed to accommodate the
First Amendment and the competing state interest in reputation must
recognize that the First Amendment interest in press exercise of the
selection and packaging function does not fluctuate. The Gertz opinion
also indicates that such a standard must determine an appropriate
121. But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(asserting Gerlz had rejected "appropriateness of judicial inquiry into 'the legitimacy
of interest in a particular event or subject' ") (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 78-79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
122. Firestone indicates that the public figure standard is not the only component
of the Gertz liability rule that interferes with protected press activity. Gertz claimed
to lessen the chilling effect of large damage awards by forbidding punitive or presumed
damages absent a showing of actual malice and by limiting ordinary damages to com-
pensation for actual injury. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). How-
ever, by permitting Mrs. Firestone to recover $100,000 for mental suffering, the Court
bypassed its own protective rules. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (award "subverted whatever protective influence the 'actual
injury' stricture may possess").
123. Although several large press outlets have consistently invested large sums in
litigating First Amendment questions, there is evidence that smaller newspapers are
prone to tread carefully whenever liability or litigation expenses are conceivable. Cf.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 610 n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing impact of prior restraints on small newspapers).
124. See pp. 1732-33 supra (setting out Gertz public figure definitions).
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level of legitimate state interest. 25 The public figure standard pro-
posed below, derived from both post-Gertz and common law public
figure cases, is designed to reflect these concerns. 126
A. A Proposed Public Figure Standard
The proposed standard offers an alternative to the public figure
definitions in Gertz and complements the remainder of the Gertz lia-
bility rule.' 27 Instead of defining public figures as individuals of
"power and influence" or persons who have taken part in a "public
controversy," a public figure might be defined as an individual who
has access to self-help remedies. 2 8 Such a general public figure defi-
nition would reflect the level of legitimate state interest underlying
Gertz' adoption of a public figure standard, 29 while eliminating the
judicial content determinations required under the Gertz standard.130
The proposed standard reduces the need for detailed and subjective
judicial inquiries into a plaintiff's access to self-help. In addition, this
standard creates a set of presumptions that can be applied in all cases
without inquiry into the merit of published information and thereby
implements the definitional balancing process that Gertz undertook
in part.' 3 ' Although presumptions necessarily entail some arbitrary
125. This Note does not claim that Gertz' estimation of the individual and state
interests in defamation is a definitive statement. Justice White, for one, has argued that
Gertz' abolition of liability without fault and limitation on the size of damage awards
abridge those interests to an unwarranted extent. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, Gertz is the most forceful articulation
of the state and individual interests offered in any Supreme Court defamation decision,
and its reasoning is accepted here as the appropriate level at which to balance them
with countervailing First Amendment interests.
126. The proposed public figure standard seeks only to accommodate the competing
interests at stake in the law of defamation. It is not contended that the rule should be
applied to related tort actions against the press, such as the tort of invasion of privacy.
Although many of the considerations involved there may be similar, unique difficulties
exist which demand separate treatment.
127. See pp. 1731-33 supra (setting out Gertz liability rule). The proposed standard
is not, of course, the only one constitutionally permissible. A state that did not seek
to provide maximum protection for individual reputation might eliminate the public
figure concept and adopt an actual malice standard in all defamation cases. To be
constitutionally acceptable, however, the standard would have to apply to all defamation
cases, not only to those involving matters of public concern.
128. The proposed public figure standard is based on the rationale for erecting
the category articulated by Justice Harlan in Butts and Hill, and adopted in Gertz.
See pp. 1729-30, 1733 supra. Unlike the Harlan approach, however, the proposed standard
eliminates the requirement of a "public controversy" and creates a set of presumptions
about self-help that determine when a plaintiff is a public figure.
129. See pp. 1729-30 supra.
130. See p. 1739 supra.
131. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267, 284 (1964) the Supreme
Court rejected a state law doctrine that presumed legal injury from the fact of pub-
lication because it contravened the First Amendment interest. It can be argued that
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application in individual cases, those proposed are designed to estab-
lish clear categories of press protection and to isolate those individuals
entitled to state protection.132
Individuals who have access to self-help remedies are those who
have realistic access to a roughly equivalent audience to counter the
defamation.J 33 They thus presumably have the opportunity to miti-
gate their damages effectively 34 and to reduce their injury substan-
tially. Cases decided under both common law and Gertz liability rules
suggest that damages can be mitigated effectively in four ways: the
publication in question can print a retraction as prominent as the
original defamation; the publication can provide the individual with a
roughly equivalent opportunity to reply; the individual can make
public statements disseminated by the press to a comparable audience
because all presumptions are necessarily overinclusive those proposed here will con-
sistently undervalue the state interest in individual reputation. Unlike those at issue
in New York Times, however, the presumptions used here do not prevent exercise of
constitutional rights; instead, they aid in the protection of a constitutional guarantee.
Cf. Freund, William J. Brennan, Jr., 86 YALE L.J. 1015, 1017 (1977) ("Procedural though
they are, [presumptions] are powerful levers in the enforcement of constitutional
guarantees.")
Even though the proposed presumptions are rebuttable, they are necessarily over-
inclusive to some extent and will encompass individuals who do not suspect that their
conduct may prompt media inquiry. Such overinclusiveness is a characteristic of all such
presumptions, including the Gertz standard. Although Gertz presumes that all individuals
who take an active role in a "public controversy" have assumed the risk of defamation,
there will be situations in which such an individual will be unaware of any potential
harm. Moreover, there will be individuals involved in situations courts conclude are
not "public controversies" who will in fact have assumed risk.
132. See Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 177 n.33 (D.D.C. 1977)
("[I]nasmuch as the media have no way of ascertaining with certainty-much less of
proving-the actual thought processes of a putative public figure but instead must rely
on objective indicia of his intentions .... the standard must be an objective one").
133. Tort law has long recognized that the availability of self-help remedies will
effectively mitigate damages. The ability to mitigate in a particular case does not lead
to a verdict for defendant under traditional tort theory but often results in limited
or no recovery for plaintiff. See, e.g., Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123
A.2d 473 (1966); O'Connor v. Field, 266 A.D. 121, 41 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1943); Webb v. Call
Publishing Co., 173 Wis. 45, 180 N.W. 263 (1920). Approximately 30 states have passed
statutes that deny a plaintiff punitive damages and occasionally general damages when
a retraction has been printed. Stevens, Defamation of Political Figures: Another Look
at the Times-Sullivan Rule, 27 FED. Com. B.J. 99, 105 (1974).
134. Although the common law has long recognized that a reply mitigates damages,
there has been some concern that its effectiveness is overstated. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) ("fA]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices
to undo harm of defamatory falsehood."); Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle:
A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 371, 376
(1970) (similar criticism); cf. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Trx. L. REV. 199, 229 ('1976) (asserting mitigation
doctrine is disincentive to reasonable press conduct). On the other hand, the common
law's acceptance of a reply as an effective mitigation device is supported by the First
Amendment doctrine that "truth" will emerge from the conflict of competing informa-
tion. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (First
Amendment marketplace of ideas).
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that contradict the defamation; or relatively frequent prior access to
roughly equivalent media in the relevant community can indicate that
future access is probable. 35 Under the proposed standard, a court would
determine whether an individual has such access to self-help and, if
he does, would presume that he is a public figure.
A court necessarily exercises a measure of discretion in determining
whether a retraction is as prominently presented as a defamatory state-
ment or whether a plaintiff's refutation has been disseminated to a
comparable audience. Although difficult cases may arise, a press de-
fendant has the power to eliminate uncertainty and to ensure that a
plaintiff is a public figure simply by printing a retraction, by offering
reply space, or by accurately reporting the contents of a plaintiff's
denial. Moreover, the possibility of a defamation action in a particu-
lar case gives the press an incentive to publish retractions and replies
as prominently as the original defamation. 130 Courts should also find
access to self-help when a rebuttal is printed or broadcast by a media
outlet with a roughly similar audience in the distribution area of
the media defendant. 137
The proposed standard does not necessarily include in the public
figure category all individuals who "invite attention and comment"1 38
or otherwise assume the risk of defamation. Although this premise of
the Harlan approach in Butts 39 was adopted by the Gertz majority, 40
135. These presumptions are drawn from both common law precedents, where the
applicability of these circumstances was pleaded in an attempt to mitigate damages, see
note 133 supra (citing cases), and from similar experience under Gertz leading to an
individual being declared a public figure. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D.D.C. 1976) (corporation public figure because
it was in constant process of issuing press releases); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F.
Supp. 1041, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (author had ample access to mass media); Buchanan v.
Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 n.l (D.D.C. 1975) (plaintiff public figure be-
cause he successfully sought timely retractions); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co.,
555 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 1976) (persons involved in broadcast rebutted charges made by
anonymous caller).
136. The ability of a news organization to print a retraction or to offer reply space
should not be equated with a right to reply for defamation plaintiffs. Such a statutory
right was in fact suggested by the Rosenbloom plurality. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (Brennan, J.). However, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), held that a mandatory right to reply is unconstitu-
tional. Although the proposed standard gives the press an incentive to offer a reply
when it fears the greater injury of a large damage award, the press is not penalized
for refusing to do so when its article is not in fact defamatory.
137. Similarly, courts should not require that retractions or replies be published on
the same page or cover the same number of column inches as the original statement.
Rather, a retraction or reply should be sufficient whenever it is reasonably likely to
be seen by a roughly comparable audience.
138. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
139. See p. 1730 supra.
140. See p. 1733 supra.
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the tort concept of assumption of risk is so amorphous that it is im-
possible to define explicitly those situations in which an individual as-
sumes the risk of defamation. 141 Moreover, judicial inquiry into as-
sumption of risk gives courts an incentive to determine whether a
plaintiff has taken part in a public controversy because defamation
plaintiffs are likely to know that such situations might be the subject
of press scrutiny.'142 A public figure category based on assumption of
risk would, therefore, lead to interference with the selection and pack-
aging function. 43 Such interference is unnecessary because the press
can assure a plaintiff's public figure status by providing him with
access to self-help remedies.
A court should rule on whether a plaintiff is a public figure before
the trier of fact determines fault.14 4 If the individual is a public figure,
the standard of liability is actual malice.14 5 Thus, the court would
141. The Harlan rationale for constructing a public figure category has been criti-
cized as "balancing . . . run riot." Kalven, supra note 33, at 301; see id. at 299 ("The
cardinal difficulty [with Harlan approach] is that it appears to lack constitutional di-
mensions. It makes at a constitutional level more discriminations than two centuries
of tort law has [sic] worked out at the common-law levell")
There is relatively little clear judicial explanation of the assumption of risk concept.
See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. RPv. 122, 123
(1961) (assumption of risk "a phrase of art" which is "inadequate for signifying grounds
of decision because of uncertainty about its meaning"); Wade, The Place of Assumption
of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5, 14 (1961) (assumption of risk concept
"very confusing" and "used to beg the real question"). The cases exemplify this con-
fusion. See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90
(1959) (assumption of risk defense partially abolished in New Jersey because often con-
fused with other tort concepts); W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 68, at 439 (4th ed. 1971) (as-
sumption of risk often synonymous with concepts of "no duty" and "contributory negli-
gence"). Moreover, unlike the standard proposed here, traditional tort notions of assump-
tion of risk almost always involve a factual inquiry into the subjective knowledge and
voluntary state of mind of each plaintiff, see id. at 447; Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense,
22 LA,. L. REv. 77, 78 (1961), an inquiry too uncertain for First Amendment purposes.
142. See pp. 1730, 1733 supra (both Harlan approach and Gertz standard equate in-
volvement in public controversy with assumption of risk).
143. See pp. 1739-43 supra ("public controversy" standard interferes with selection
and packaging function).
144. This has been the practice of all courts that have made public figure determi-
nations since Gertz. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440,
444 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
As under traditional tort procedure, if a plaintiff is found not to be a public figure,
common law notions of self-help and assumption of risk can still be introduced later
in a proceeding as either an indication of mitigation of damages or an affirmative de-
fense to a finding of fault.
145. The New York Times public official category comports with this analysis. It is
not claimed that information concerning public officials is protected more than other
information disseminated by the press. Nonetheless, in cases involving defamation of
public officials, the state interest is greatly reduced because the public official, over
the run of cases, has ready access to self-help remedies. The act of acceptance of public
office is an objective standard which can be applied in all like cases. This reduced
level of state interest was recognized by the Gertz majority. 418 U.S. at 344; accord, Picker-
ing v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
1749
The Yale Law Journal
decide which category is applicable to the particular plaintiff and
then apply the appropriate standard. Although the first step involves
an assessment of the facts of the case, it does not, because of the ob-
jective presumptions supplied by the proposed standard, involve un-
checked judicial balancing. The second step simply requires applica-
tion of a standard already determined through definitional balancing.
An application of this standard indicates that the Court's disposition
of Firestone may be incorrect. In Firestone the plaintiff had held
prior news conferences, which were widely reported.140 This raises a
presumption that she had access to self-help remedies. Mrs. Firestone
would therefore be deemed a public figure and would recover only
upon a finding of actual malice. 147 Such a result in Firestone and
other similar cases would represent a more desirable accommodation
of the competing interests than the result under Gertz.
B. The Competing Interests Under the Proposed Standard
By substituting the proposed public figure standard for the Gertz
standard, the resulting liability rule would reduce the number of plain-
tiffs entitled to recover from the press absent actual malice while
minimizing interference with the press's exercise of its selection and
packaging function. Rather than requiring judicial inquiry into the
existence of a "public controversy" or into possession by individuals
of "persuasive power," a series of content-neutral criteria are presumed
to establish such conclusions. The court would direct its attention to
the needs of individual plaintiffs and not to the content of press pub-
lication. Moreover, the press could rely on these presumptions when-
ever the individual's circumstances satisfy these criteria, and it could
make selection and packaging decisions on the basis of criteria that
facilitate informed choice.
It might be argued that the press will be penalized for its exercise
of the selection and packaging function when an individual who does
not fall within these presumptions brings a defamation action. Un-
like the Gertz alternative, however, the proposed standard would not
result in a body of judicial precedent detailing what information the
press can safely publish based on its content. Furthermore, the pro-
posed standard avoids the vagueness of the "public controversy" and
146. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 n.3 (1976).
147. If Mrs. Firestone had not been a public figure under the proposed standard,
the fact that her husband might have been a public figure would not affect her ability
to recover. Since the proposed standard presumes that the First Amendment interest
is constant in all defamation cases, and that the standard of liability fluctuates with the
need of each plaintiff for state protection, the status of other individuals is irrelevant.
1750
Vol. 87: 1723, 1978
Gertz and the Editorial Function
"persuasive power" categories. Although any liability rule designed
to accommodate other interests will interfere with the selection and
packaging function to some extent, 148 the proposed standard limits
the instances in which the press will hesitate to publish. The press
must be on guard only when it is uncertain whether a plaintiff falls
within the articulated presumptions and not when a court has de-
termined that the content of a press publication is without merit.
Moreover, the press can ensure that a plaintiff is deemed a public
figure simply by printing a retraction, by offering reply space, or by
reporting a denial.
The press might be inhibited from publishing certain information
only when vindication of what Gertz identified as the legitimate state
interest in individual reputation requires that result; that is, where
private citizens who have no access to self-help are defamed. Admit-
tedly, identification of this legitimate state interest suffers from the
vagueness inherent in the concepts underlying individual reputation. 149
Nevertheless, the proposed standard accords with the Gertz determi-
nation of who is most worthy of protection and builds increased pro-
tection for those individuals into the liability rule itself. An individual
who has no opportunity to mitigate his hurt through self-help reme-
dies is "not only more vulnerable to injury"'150 but is also "more de-
serving of recovery." 151 These individuals receive protection identical
to that afforded by Gertz but under a standard that, unlike Gertz,
limits interference with protected press activity.
148. See note 92 supra.
149. See note 75 supra.
150. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
151. Id. A perplexing problem is the question of defamation actions brought by
corporations. It is arguable that because a corporation's claim to relief in these cases
"does not involve 'the essential dignity and worth of every human being'" it should
be denied a cause of action for defamation. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976). Although this resolution seems
appropriate, post-Gertz courts appear to be applying a public figure analysis to actions
brought by corporations. Id.; Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F.
Supp. 814, 820-21 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The Court in Martin Marietta, however, rested its
decision on a determination that Rosenbloom applied. 417 F. Supp. at 956. Under the
proposed standard, most corporations would probably be declared public figures under
one of the articulated presumptions. The Martin Marietta Corporation, for example,
would be a public figure because of concentrated public relations efforts involving almost
constant mailings of press releases. Id. at 957.
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